Employees di¤er both in terms of general human capital and …rm-speci…c human capital (or match with a particular …rm). Current employers typically have access to more information about their employees than rival employers. This information asymmetry a¤ects the distribution of wages, turnover rates, pro…ts, and the extent of allocative ine¢ ciency in the labour market. We begin by exploring the implications of di¤erent information structures and highlight that information a¤ects both the extent and distribution of adverse selection. We then suppose that …rms can a¤ect the information that they or their rivals observe, thereby endogenizing the extent and nature of asymmetric information between current and rival employers. In particular, we highlight that di¤erent information structures that lead to similar adverse selection can di¤er in their allocative e¢ ciency. Using this observation, we detail how optimal information management policies vary across …rms with di¤erent human capital management priorities, and how these decisions a¤ect aggregate labour market outcomes.
Introduction
Two central and established themes in labour theory are adverse selection and the distinction between …rm-speci…c and general human capital. However, typically, these themes have been considered separately. This paper begins by introducing match-speci…c value in a standard model of adverse selection, building on a large literature initiated by Waldman (1984) and Greenwald (1986) . Speci…cally, rival employers observe some statistic about a worker's productivity and make wage o¤ers. Having observed these o¤ers, the current employer decides whether to retain the worker (matching the highest outside o¤er) or to release her.
Allowing for …rm-speci…c matches introduces a regression to the mean e¤ect in the model. This arises because the current employer's best estimates-based on her private information-of a worker's productivity if retained within the …rm (retained human capital) and if released to join another …rm (general human capital) are not perfectly correlated: sometimes workers will be expected to be more productive if retained and sometimes more productive if released. In this context, regression to the mean implies that workers with high retained productivity are likely to have lower productivity elsewhere, conversely workers with low retained productivity in their …rst employment are expected to have higher productivity elsewhere. This provides a reason for some workers to switch jobs purely on the grounds of e¢ ciency. A contribution of the paper is to explore how this 'legitimate'reason for job turnover interacts with the other fundamental force, adverse selection, under di¤erent information structures (that is, assumptions about the information held by current and rival employers).
In characterising the e¤ect of an information structure, it is useful to focus on the extent of adverse selection that arises when outside employers draw inferences from the current employer's retention decision. When outside …rms have information that eliminates the need to make this inference there is no adverse selection. For example, this will be the case is outside employers have the same information as the current employer about a worker's outside productivity (or general human capital). Equally, if the outside employers have the same estimate as the current employer of inside productivity, then public information is …ner than that contained in the retention decision, so once again there is no adverse selection. Note, however, that while these two information structures or regimes induce the same adverse selection (and hence the same expected wage), they di¤er in their e¢ ciency in allocating labour.
More generally, in assessing di¤erent information structures, we de…ne the quantity of adverse selection at each realisation of the statistic observed by outside …rms as the di¤erence between the wage if there were no private information and its equilibrium value. In Section 3.3, in our joint normal speci…cation of the model, we show that information structures consisting of a garbled report of the current employer's best estimate of outside productivity (i.e. general human capital plus random noise) generate an amount of adverse selection that is independent of the realisation. However, we identify other information structures for which adverse selection is imposed more heavily on those workers whom it is e¢ cient for the …rm to retain. 1 Our goal is to analyze the impact of di¤erent information structures on average wages, …rm pro…ts and retention decisions. For application, it is important to consider how di¤erent information structures might arise. First, it is natural that the nature of production, or the industry might lead to exogenously di¤erent information structures. Trivial, but illustrative examples, include that the information available to potential employers about sportsmen, actors, and musicians is quite di¤erent to the information on private investigators, or spies. Similarly, the information about programmers that outsiders observe can di¤er dramatically depending on whether the project is open source or closed source (as discussed for example in Lerner and Tirole (2005) , Spiegel (2005) , and in an approach perhaps closest to this paper, Blatter and Niedermayer (2008) ).
Further, varied information structures might arise endogenously through …rms'decisions. Speci…cally, we analyze …rms'strategic choices when they commit to the information available to potential rival employers. For example, …rms might credibly commit (either contractually, or often through reputational concerns) as to how much time a programmer can spend on open source, or the extent to which a consultant or lawyer has direct access and contact with clients, publicize that the worker is indeed employed at the …rm, for example, through a website, or even institute rules and restrictions on social interactions (Leibeskind, 1997). More broadly, choices over production technologies (such as whether to require team or solo production) and the design of organization (including layers of hierarchy and promotion criteria) will a¤ect the information structure. Here, we abstract from considering direct costs in such choices and, instead, treat the …rm as directly choosing the nature of the signal observed by rival potential employers.
Using our characterization of the e¤ects of di¤erent information structures, it is relatively straightforward to characterize …rm's preferred information policies. Our results here are driven by a simple trade-o¤: policies that best enable …rms to exploit talent (by capturing general human capital rents) make it hard to attract employees, and vice versa. Equilibrium policies therefore re ‡ect the relative importance to the …rm of attracting versus exploiting talent.
To explore these ideas, we extend the model by supposing that …rms compete to hire workers in each of two periods. In the …rst stage, no …rm holds an informational advantage. Firms can gain informational advantage through …rst period employment and depending on initial contracts which consist not only of a wage o¤er, but, also, a disclosure policy (leading to a particular information structure). Having chosen a …rst period employer, workers generate performance statistics which are privately observed by their employer, as well as acquiring skills that are valuable in second period production. The second period then proceeds exactly as above, outside …rms observe some statistic of this information (arising from the disclosure policy to which the …rst period employer had committed) and then make second period wage o¤ers. Having observed these o¤ers, …rst period employers decide whether to retain their workers (matching the highest outside o¤er) or to release them. Workers then engage in second period production and the game ends.
Note that in the …rst period competition between …rms, …rms attract workers both directly, through …rst period wages, and indirectly, through the future careers (as expressed by the expected second period wages) that they o¤er. These career prospects, in turn, arise from the general skills and training that are o¤ered in the …rm (which, for the most part, we treat as exogenous) and from the disclosure policy chosen. Disclosure policies, however, do not simply imply transfers of second period surplus between employees and …rst period employers, since di¤erent disclosure policies vary in the extent of surplus-destroying allocative distortion that they introduce. We can quantify this explicitly using our characterization of information structures that associates with each possible disclosure policy a pair of outcomes: expected future earnings for the worker and expected future pro…ts for the …rm.
Thus the disclosure policy for our …rms corresponds to the best choice from the set of feasible wage, pro…t pairs, bearing in mind that …rst period wages can transfer future pro…t to workers but, because of credit constraints, not necessarily future wages to pro…t. Firms facing competition to attract workers (competitive …rms) will seek to maximise e¢ ciency (the sum of future earnings and future pro…ts which are transferred to the worker as current wages). In contrast, 'technologically advantaged' …rms face limited competition and transform worker rent into pro…ts via adverse selection (skillaugmenting …rms).
These results have implications for labour market outcomes. 2 In Section 5.2.1, we calculate how wage distributions and labour turnover rates respond, via information management policies, to technological changes in the skill-augmenting sector. A decline in either the mean of estimated general human capital formation or mean match quality, or an increase in the variance of estimated match quality, increases the rate of labour turnover in the skill-augmenting sector. Interestingly, since an increase in the variance of an estimate can be interpreted as an improvement in information, this suggests that observed increases in labour turnover could stem from improved information acquisition within 'innovative'…rms. Turning to the distribution of wages, an increase in the "skill-gap" (the expected human capital di¤erence between the skill-augmenting and competitive …rms) increases inequality and skews the distribution of wage in the skill-augmenting sector to the left, while an increase in the mean, or a reduction in the variance, of estimated match quality increases inequality but has little impact on skewness.
Related Literature As noted above, our analysis draws on the familiar concepts of adverse selection and regression to the mean (the latter inducing match quality). 3 These concepts have been widely applied in the labour economics literature, although typically separately. The notion of match quality, building on Becker's distinction of speci…c human capital, was introduced by Jovanovic (1979) who shows that a non-degenerate distribution of worker-…rm match values leads to worker turnover as information about match values accrues over time. In emphasising the dynamics of the learning process, Jovanovic abstracts from general human capital and (hence) adverse selection aspects. In contrast, Waldman (1984) and Greenwald (1986) focuses squarely on adverse selection, highlighting that this force can lead workers to earn less than their marginal products and has implications labour turnover. 4 Indeed, in Greenwald's model, there is no turnover unless there is a possibility that separations occur for exogenous reasons. We show that introducing a non-degenerate distribution of match quality into a model of general human capital formation counterbalances the forces of adverse selection. Even when …rms hold this view and details such a mechanism. 3 Adverse selection can, of course, be traced back to Akerlof (1970) . Regression to the mean predates even Galton (1885) who …xed the idea in what Koenker (2001) calls "Arguably, the most important statistical graphic ever produced."Galton's graphic related child and parental height. Tall parents tend to have tall children, though not so tall as themselves. Similarly for short parents. Of course, we are concerned with productivity in …rst and subsequent employments rather than heights of parents and children but the principal is the same. 4 The fact that workers earn less than their marginal products gives rise to the possibility of …rm-sponsored human capital investments. This idea is developed in many subsequent papers including Katz and Ziderman (1990) , Chang and Wang (1996) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) . Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) provide a review that emphasises the role of exogenous market frictions.
private information relating to general human capital (the Greenwald case), our model endogenously generates positive labour turnover.
In this sense, our paper is related to Li (2006) who also seeks to explain job mobility in the presence of asymmetric information over worker productivity. Li models the wage determination process as a …rst price auction. This creates a bidding situation similar to Milgrom and Weber's (1981) analysis of the 'mineral rights' model in which there is a single informed bidder and a number of uninformed bidders. In this setting, the uninformed bidders adopt a mixed strategy which generates positive turnover and a non-degenerate distribution of wages. Though in Li's setting there is no match-speci…c component of productivity and no e¢ ciency consequences of turnover. In our model, wages are determined via a second price auction and turnover arises from the nondegenerate distribution of match quality. Notably, this gives an e¢ ciency rationale for turnover that is absent in Li (2006) . A further di¤erence is that Li assumes the information structure to be exogenously …xed. Eeckhout (2006) also studies a setting where current employers (exogenously) have superior information to outsiders to examine implications for turnover and wages. In his model there is gradual learning, as in Jovanovic (1979) , but over general human capital rather than match quality. This approach contrasts with our model where information asymmetries are endogenous and there is persistence in match-speci…c values (the latter leads to our regression to the mean e¤ect). A further di¤erence arises in the wagedetermination process. In Eeckhout's model wages are determined via a second price auction with two heterogenous bidders-an incumbent and a challenger, each of whom have private information (see, also, Pinkston 2008 ). In our model, wages are pinned down by the behaviour of (interim) identical outside …rms. This "competitive fringe" assumption greatly simpli…es the analysis.
Although we abstract from internal organisation costs of information management in order to focus on the adverse selection vs e¢ ciency trade-o¤ most directly, our paper relates to a signi…cant organisational economics literature in which internal organisation costs play a major role. Waldman (1984) capital management issues and, furthermore, impacts through information ‡ows to the labour market. 6 Finally, our paper is also closely related to a growing literature studying information disclosure (see, e.g., Calzolari and Pavan (2006) , Mukherjee (2008) , Koch and Peyrache (2005) and Albano and Leaver (2005) ). Like the current paper, this literature highlights that an employer's information management policy can form part of overall compensation as it in ‡uences an employee's future career prospects. 7 (See also Kim and Marschke (2005) and Lewis and Yao (2006) who explore this idea in the context of researchers). Though, many of these papers highlight career concern and moral hazard aspects omitted in our analysis; our paper focuses on the detailed implications for wages and turnovers of a broader range of information structures than is typically considered (for example, Albano and Leaver (2005) consider only fully transparent and fully opaque structures). Moreover, this paper in allowing for variation in both general human capital and match values, allows for consideration of e¢ cient turnover and for richer information structure than many of these works which either force all workers to move …rms between the …rst and second period (Koch and Peyrache, 2005) and Calzolari and Pavan, 2006) or assume that the worker is always more productive in the outside …rm by a …xed amount (Mukherjee, 2008 ).
A Model of Information Structures and Labour

Market Outcomes
Consider a current employer I who privately observes a vector-valued 'test statistic'Q I . The vector Q I should be thought of as everything the …rm knows about its worker. In particular, information in Q I will allow the current employer to estimate Y II , the value of a worker's output when retained in …rm I, and Y II 0 the value of her output when released to a di¤erent …rm I 0 . It is convenient to think of the current employers information Q I as simply given by Y I the vector of productivities. This notation is somewhat cumbersome, but proves useful in the extension of the model in Section 4. While the current employer, or inside …rm, observes Q I , rival employers observe a 6 Burguet, Caminal and Matutes (1999) take a di¤erent path using similar ingredients. They argue that in certain industries, speci…cally professional sports, characterised by extreme visibility of performance, incentives are created for restrictive labour practices-such as transfer fees. 7 Calzolari and Pavan (2006) allow for general disclosure policies, and do not have a labour market application speci…cally in mind. They do not consider the possibility of retention and assume a monopsonist employer in the second period, leading to somewhat di¤erent e¤ects and considerations. di¤erent statistic T I = T I (Q I ). Note, we assume that inside …rms always have available any relevant information that outside employers hold. 8 Employment Wage Determination Outside …rms compete to hire the worker and make "take it or lose it"employment wage o¤ers. The employer then either matches the best o¤er made to the worker or releases this worker to join one of the highest outside bidders. Equivalently, there is an ascending open auction in which …rms bid up wages until all but one …rm drops out of the bidding.
As noted above, an alternative that does deliver somewhat di¤erent results is proposed by Li (2006). Li's …rst price auction model would appear to be appropriate in cases where …nal wage o¤ers can be made by either side of the market, but not credibly communicated to the other side before the wage round must be concluded.
Simplifying Assumptions
In order to simplify the analysis of the employment wage determination process, we impose the following assumption on the joint distribution of test statistics and productivities. Outside …rms are interim identical: they all take the same view of the worker's likely output in their …rm (though the realizations in di¤erent …rms may turn out to di¤er). Given this assumption, we can uniquely de…ne
The random variable G I is the current employer's best estimate of the worker's value in an outside employment (her general human capital). Since the current employer holds all of the information relating to this worker in the economy, G I is also the quantity that 8 Note that, for a given information structure, all the information required to determine wages and retention decisions comprises the information held by rival employers T I and the inside …rm's best estimate of the worker's productivity in the …rm R I = E[Y II jQ I ]. It follows, that while it is convenient to assume that the …rm observes Q I , there would be no loss in assuming that the …rm observes only T I and R I . This lower information requirement for the incumbent …rm might be a more palatable assumption and viewed as consistent with our maintained interpretation of the disclosed statistic T I as arising through the …rm's organizational design.
outside …rms seek to estimate when making their employment wage o¤ers. Similarly, we can de…ne
The random variable R I is the …rst period employer's best estimate of the worker's value in the current, inside employment (her retained human capital).
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G I will generally di¤er from R I . Experience Q I = q may reveal that a worker …ts especially well with …rm
or, equally, that there has been a bad match. Di¤erences between G I and R I will play an important role in our analysis, with the statistical possibility of a bad match endogenously generating labour turnover. It is natural to adopt a framework in which this matching manifests itself through regression to the mean: workers who perform well (badly) in their initial employment will tend to perform worse (better) if they switch jobs. This corresponds to an assumption that the regression 'line'E[G I jR I = x] has a slope (derivative) everywhere between zero and one, implying, for instance, that Cov(G I ; R I ) 0 and Cov(R I G I ; R I ) 0: In fact, we will make a somewhat stronger assumption. This assumption leads to the following convenient properties, as proven in the Appendix.
Remark 1 Assumption 2 implies that, E[G
Regression to the mean introduces a "genuine reason for sale"which counterbalances the standard Akerlof lemons e¤ect and tends to protect the market for experienced workers from complete collapse. Given regression to the mean, in the absence of any further information disclosure, an outside …rm need not conclude that any worker it can hire at a given wage will generate a loss at that wage; rather, a released worker may simply have been a bad match. A further implication of regression to the mean is that e¢ ciency in the allocation of labour requires a positive turnover of workers; to maximise productivity, a selection of workers should switch jobs.
Analysis
Wage Determination and De…nitions
With Assumption 1 in hand, characterising wages is relatively straightforward. Since outside employers are interim identical, employment wages will be set in Bertrand competition, and hence equal the expected productivity of a worker in an outside …rm conditional on the publicly available information. This information includes the event that the worker is released by her current employer. 10 The equilibrium employment wage when a worker is employed by …rm I and T I = T I (Q I ) = t is realised is de…ned implicitly by
whenever such a w T I (t) exists. 11 The notation w T I (t) denotes the wage payable under disclosure policy T I = T I (Q I ) when T I = t is realised (we use T I to denote both the disclosure policy and the random variable that it generates); w T I (T I ) therefore denotes the random wage which will be generated by the disclosure policy. We will write the expected employment wage as
The expected pro…t, is equal to output less employment wages in the event that the worker is retained (which occurs if the pro…ts from doing so are positive), which we write as
where (x) + denotes x when positive, zero otherwise.
Next, we de…ne the degree of adverse selection when T I = t is realised
The quantity AS T I (t) measures how much lower the employment wage is when outside …rms condition on the employer's retention behaviour in addition to the realisation T I = t. Expected adverse selection equals the expected shortfall in employment wages from outside productivity,
Finally, it is convenient to introduce notation for the feasible set, ( I ). This set is the main object of our analysis and consists of the expected wage-pro…t pairs (W T I ; T I ) that can be achieved for a given set of disclosure policies, I .
We proceed in two stages. First, in Section 3.2, we establish some benchmark results under our general distributional assumptions for (G I ; R I ) but with a highly restricted set of information structures. Speci…cally, we focus on the case where I = fG I ; R I ; ? I g in which outside …rms observe the expected productivity of the worker G I , the realised productivity of the worker in their current employment (more strictly, the estimate of future productivity within the …rm), or simply nothing. Most of the related literature also restricts attention to these policies. Our analysis clari…es the forces at work and …xes some general features of the feasible set. Then, in Section 3.3, we specialise to the joint normal case. This allows us to explicitly trace through the impact of a rich set of alternative information structures on labour market outcomes. Here we consider the following three more or less natural information structure.
General Distribution, Restricted Information Structures
1. G I disclosure, outside …rms observe …rm I's best estimate of the worker's general human capital:
2. R I disclosure, outside …rms observe …rm I's of the worker's productivity if retained within the …rm
3. ? I disclosure, 13 outside …rms observe no additional information: T I (Q I ) = ? I .
Wages and Pro…ts
Notice that there is no adverse selection under general disclosure: AS G I (g) = 0. This is because, having observed G I = g, outside …rms have no reason to pay attention to the employer's retention behaviour. Taking expectations over the random variable w G I (G I ), the expected employment wage is simply expected general human capital
R I disclosure
Again, there is no adverse selection, AS R I (r) = 0; in this case, because the disclosed statistic R I = r supplies …ner information than the event that the worker is released, R I w R (r). However, there is now regression to the mean, with r E[G I jR I = r] increasing in r. Intuitively, outside …rms anticipate that low (high) values of …rm I retained productivity may be due to a negative (positive) match and that productivity in a new match will tend to regress to the ex-ante expected value. By the law of iterated expectations, the expected employment wage is still equal to expected general human capital
? I disclosure
There is now adverse selection, AS ? I > 0: However, in contrast to Akerlof's (1970) lemons model or Greenwald's (1986) application to the labour market, w ? I does not collapse to the lower support of G I (even in the absence of a minimum wage) because outside …rms anticipate that low values of …rm I productivity will partly be redressed by regression to the mean. Using the above wage comparisons, we now state two results which compare the information structures fG I ; R I ; ? I g. Proposition 1. For any …rm I, G I disclosure generates maximum expected surplus:
which is clearly the maximum achievable expected surplus.
Under G I -disclosure a current employer releases its worker whenever R I G I : Since this implies that the worker is released if and only if there is a negative match, labour is always e¢ ciently allocated across …rms. The same cannot be said of the two other information structures. Under R I -disclosure, …rm I releases its worker whenever R I < E[G I jR I ] and so it is possible for the worker to be released following a positive match (because G I is low) and retained following a negative match (because G I is high). As we now show, ? I -disclosure is less e¢ cient still.
Proposition 2. For any …rm I,
ii. ? I -disclosure generates W ? I W G I ; ? I G I with
Proof. The ranking of expected employment wages W ? I < W R I = W G I follows from (7), (9) and (10) . The pro…t ranking R I G I follows from Proposition 1 and the fact that
The result follows because the variation in G I tends to cancel the variation in R I and convex functions 'like'variation. More precisely, note that
is increasing in x by Assumption 2. This fact, together with the equality of means, implies the random
Using the convexity of (x) + gives the result.
To establish W ? I + ? I W R I + R I note that under R I disclosure, …rm I retains the worker in the event E[R I G I jR I ] 0: Hence the R I disclosure allocation solves the following optimal allocation problem
where p is any probability of retention based on R I : The ? I disclosure e¢ ciency level
is smaller by revealed preference.
The set, (fG I ; R I ; ? I g) of the expected wages and pro…ts that can be generated by the disclosure polices G I ; R I ; ? I , as derived in Propositions 1 and 2, is illustrated in Figure 1 , where downward sloping lines depict points of equal expected surplus. When outside …rms observe G I , this generates higher expected surplus for …rm I than when the outside …rms observe R I because, as noted above, it results in more e¢ cient retention behaviour. Bertrand competition between outside …rms ensures that this expected surplus is split between …rm I and its worker. Since the expected employment wage is the same in both cases, …rm I must be strictly worse o¤ under R I -disclosure by virtue of the "smaller pie". Ine¢ cient retention behaviour creates an even "smaller pie" when outside …rms have no information. Intuitively, adverse selection depresses wages and causes excess recruitment relative to R I -disclosure. A key di¤erence now is that, although expected surplus is smaller, the worker receives a smaller share. Proposition 2 tells us that adverse selection drives the expected employment wage W ? I su¢ ciently far below W G I to leave …rm I better o¤. Notice that, under ? I -disclosure the adverse selection that drives down wages is ameliorated by regression to the mean. Firm I would, therefore, enjoy higher pro…ts if the regression to the mean e¤ect were "turned o¤". In fact, the best information structure from Firm I 0 s perspective would be one which induces severe adverse selection for any worker it wishes to retain (but not for one the …rm wishes to release since this would avoid up-front transfers when the …rm must attract the worker initially). We show how an information structure along these lines can arise in Section 3.3.2, below, where we consider information structures that combine R I and G I .
Joint Normal Distribution, Arbitrary Disclosure Policies
For any …rm I, the random variables (G I ; R I ) are now assumed to be joint normally distributed.
In some of what follows (namely where we calculate wages), we will also assume that G I and (R I G I ) are independent. To avoid confusion, we will term the former case 'joint normality'and the latter the 'independent joint normal'model.
Joint normal information structures
We also limit the set I of information structures that we consider, to information structures such that (G I ; R I ; T I ) are joint normally distributed with T I scalar. This assumption rules out mixed structures (e.g. that outside …rms observe G I with probability p and R I with probability 1 p), conditional structures (e.g. observe R I if G I 0) and partitional strategies (e.g. observe either that G I 0 or G I < 0). It does, however, close the model in a natural way.
With (G I ; R I ; T I ) joint normal, a convenient parameterisation is in terms of the linear combination T I = aG I + bR I + cX I , where X I is a unit variance, independent noise term available via Q I . Since the random variable T I can always be rescaled to have any chosen mean and variance without altering its information content, only two of the parameters a, b, and c are free. It is convenient to set a = 1 b, implying that disclosure policies are characterised by the two parameters b and c:
The above parameterisation simpli…es the characterisation of the feasible set. However, it will also be useful to map from these parameters to their associated regression coe¢ cients. In what follows, we will use two simple and two multiple regression coe¢ -cients. The simple coe¢ cients are on T I in the regression of G I (R I ) on T I , which we denote by G I T I ( R I T I ). Normalising V ar(G I ) = 1, denoting V ar(R I G I ) by 2 , and assuming Cov(G I ; R I ) = 1, these coe¢ cients write as
and
The multiple coe¢ cients are on T I (R I ) in the multiple regression of G I on T I and R I ; which we denote by G I T I :R I ( G I R I :T I ) and write as
The three information structures discussed in Section 3.2 are easily stated under either parameterisation. Under each of these cases, …rm I's retention behaviour conveys information and so there is adverse selection for outsiders in recruitment, AS T I (t) 6 = 0.
Wages and Pro…ts
Our …rst result expresses w T I (t) in terms of the regression coe¢ cients, the conditional standard deviation of the random variable [R I jT I = t], denoted by R I jT I , and the unit normal hazard function h.
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Proposition 3. Under joint normality, the equilibrium employment wage satis…es
where …nite. Equilibrium adverse selection therefore satis…es
Proof. See Appendix.
The employment wage function takes a particularly simple form for garblings of G I , i.e. disclosures of G I plus noise. In this case, adverse selection is constant and equilibrium employment wages equal expected outside productivity conditional only on T I less this constant. To see this note that if T I is such a garbling, since R I G I is uncorrelated with G I ; it is uncorrelated with the garbling T I ; hence (R I G I )T I = 0, and therefore
Substituting this into the wage equation yields
, for all t, which implicitly de…nes AS T I (t) as a constant. We can write this constant as
where k(x) is the iteration k(x) = xh (xh (:::)), this evidently has a …xed point at zero, the only other is at a point we denote k 0:302. It follows that Corollary 1. Under joint normality, for T I any garbling of G I , the equilibrium employment wage satis…es 15 The conditional standard deviation writes as
The amount of adverse selection is, unsurprisingly, increasing in R I jT I which is a measure of how much uncertainty is left to be attributed to the retention decision. As T I garbles G I more, R I jT I increases. In general, for information structures other than garblings of G I , of course, adverse selection is not independent of the realised disclosure. Note, however, that, for any given information policy, the sign of adverse selection is constant for all realizations of the information available to outside …rms, t (it has the same sign as G I R I :T I ). Moreover at the realisation T I = 0, equation (14) remains valid for any disclosure policy for which there is …nite adverse selection. Hence, at the mean realisation of the disclosed statistics, realised wages are ranked according to the conditional standard deviations R I jT I .
Proposition 3 solves for the employment wage in terms of a calculable function. Given this function, retention decisions and the current employer's pro…ts can also be calculated for every information structure in I . 16 We refer to the upper boundary of the set of wages and pro…ts, ( I ), as the e¢ ciency frontier, since on this boundary there is no information structure that yields the same expected wage for the worker without reducing the …rm's expected pro…t. Our next result (calculated using (12) with G I and (R I G I ) assumed independent) shows that the e¢ ciency frontier does not consist of policies which garble G I with noise, rather G I is combined with R I .
Result 4.
In the independent joint normal model, for any …rm I, the e¢ ciency frontier of the set ( I ) is generated by the disclosure policies T I = (1 b)G I + bR I ; with b < 1; c = 0: It is worth pausing to discuss features of the set of wage, pro…t pairs that di¤erent information structures can generate and, in particular, its e¢ ciency frontier plotted in Figure 2 (for values of b 2 [1=3; 4=3]). We …rst consider what is required for an information structure to drive the expected employment wage below E[G K ], and then how a given reduction in W T I can be achieved most e¢ ciently. To drive the expected employment wage below E[G I ], the expected adverse selection must be positive. From (13), AS T I (t) is positive only if G I R I :T I > 0; giving a simple and intuitive condition. Firm I's retention decision will create adverse (rather than positive) selection-i.e. depress w T I (t) = E[G I jT I = t; R I w T I (t)] below E[GjT = t]-if and only if a lower value of R I is bad news for G I given T I :
One might think that this condition will hold whenever retention behaviour is informative. As Figure 3 illustrates, this is not the case; there are information structures that lead to an expected wage for the worker that lies above E[G I ], that is there is positive rather than adverse selection. The unifying feature of these information structures with G I R I :T I < 0 is that G I is combined with R I , with more weight on G I . 17 Of course, as Figure 2 also illustrates, there are many information structures that do satisfy this condition and hence drive the expected employment wage below E[G K ]. Indeed, of the four types of 'combined' structures listed at the end of Section 3.3.1, above, only the third (weighting G I ) fails in creating adverse selection. The question is therefore why some of these information structures are more e¢ cient than others, and in particular why the fourth type (di¤erencing G I and R I , with b < 0 and c = 0) traces out the e¢ ciency frontier below E[G I ]?
To see the answer, note that, even when two information structures generate the same expected employment wage, the distribution of adverse selection over t may vary. Figure 3 illustrates, depicting two information structures that generate the same expected adverse selection (the area under both quantile functions is 0:47) but with very di¤erent distributions. A garbling of G I (policy C) depresses wages uniformly: AS T I is constant at every quantile of T I = G I + p 5=2X I . In contrast, di¤erencing R I and G I (policy D) imposes a lot of adverse selection at low quantiles of T I = 3=2G I 1=2R I and little adverse selection at high quantiles (and indeed none at p = 1). This is e¢ cient, as low quantiles are associated with good matches, while high quantiles are associated with bad matches. Since this information structure depresses wages most when retention is e¢ cient and least when retention is ine¢ cient, it generates a higher surplus than the information structure where wages are depressed uniformly (in Figure 2 the wage-pro…t pair associated with policy C lies to the left of the pair associated with policy D). The above logic explains why garbling G I , the …rst type of information structure, is less e¢ cient than di¤erencing G I and R I , the fourth, and indeed why a garbling of a di¤erenced estimate of inside and outside productivity (b < 0; c 6 = 0) lies inside the e¢ ciency frontier. All that remains is to consider the second type of policy (weighting R I G I with b > 1; c = 0). The reason why this type of policy fails to trace out the e¢ ciency frontier is simple. By weighting the disclosure statistic towards R I G I , that is match quality, the information structure eliminates regression to the mean. This leaves adverse selection to hit with full force, depressing wages not simply below E[G I ] but as far as the lower support. This logic also highlights the strength of certain information structures outside the set of joint normally distributed information that we are considering here. In particular, a policy which discloses G I whenever R I G I < 0 and discloses R I otherwise, induces no allocative ine¢ ciency-those workers expected to be more productive at other …rms are released-but induces full adverse selection, driving the second period wage as far as the lower support of G I on those workers who are e¢ ciently retained.
Having discussed how di¤erent information structures a¤ect expected wages and pro…ts, we now extend the model, endogenizing the information structures associated with di¤erent …rms and tracing out implication for labour market outcomes.
A Two period model of labour market competition
In this section, we extend the basic model presented above. We suppose that there are two periods of employment. In the …rst period all potential employers hold the same information about potential employees. Employees are attracted to …rms, not only by the wages o¤ered, but also by the career prospects that a …rm o¤ers. These career prospects arise from (exogenous) variation in the extent to which …rst period employment at a …rm augments an employee's general human capital, and endogenous variation through a …rm's strategic choice of an information disclosure policy, which a¤ects the information available to rival employers competing for the worker in the second period of employment.
Speci…cally, we consider an economy that consists of N …rms (each with a single position available) and M < N workers. Firms compete to hire, or retain, a worker in periods one and two. The …rst period employer, …rm I, is the inside …rm in the second period, and wages in the second period are determined as in Section 2. It is a convenient simpli…cation to refer to …rst period employment as training and to suppose that the employee is not productive in the …rst period, but gains skills that depend on the identity of the …rst period employer.
We take the view that certain …rms, typically innovative or in some other way privileged, naturally enable workers to acquire more skills. As such, we do not assume that E[G I ] = E[G I 0 ] for all I; I 0 . Rather, we make the next simplest assumption which is to distinguish between "skill-augmenting"and "competitive"…rms. When we wish to invoke this distinction we will refer to a typical skill-augmenting …rm as …rm K and a typical competitive …rm as …rm J (I continues to denote a generic …rm). Just as Assumption 1 simpli…es second period labour market competition, Assumption 3 simpli…es …rst period labour market competition. Skill-augmenting …rms are advantaged and in short-supply, and will (therefore) all hire one worker at the prevailing wage. This leaves the remaining N N 1 exchangeable …rms to Bertrand compete for the M N 1 free workers. It is this Bertrand competition that determines the prevailing wage. Our concern will be to explore how the employment policies of di¤erent …rms vary with the size of the skill gap. We remark that the skill gap is treated here as exogenous but in a natural variant of the model it could arise from …rms choosing to invest in general human capital, as brie ‡y discussed in Section 6.
When discussing labour market outcomes, it will be of interest to consider a variant of Assumption 3 in which N 1 is a variable parameter which may exceed the number of workers M . In this event (corresponding to a high demand for labour in the skill-augmenting sector), the employment wage will be set by skill-augmenting …rms themselves.
Assumption 3
0 . There are N 1 exchangeable skill-augmenting …rms and N N 1 exchangeable competitive …rms in the economy. For each skill-augmenting …rm K;
0 di¤ers from Assumption 3 in that all the skill-augmenting …rms are identical. This will serve to make wage setting Bertrand-competitive in the case where
First Period Contracts It remains to describe, …rst period competition: The N …rms compete to hire a worker in the …rst period through publicly observable contracts. For a given …rm I, a contract speci…es:
1. A training wage w I 0. The worker is credit constrained.
2. A disclosure policy T I = T I (Q I ) from a set of possible disclosure policies (or information structures) I . Equivalently, having characterized the set of feasible second period wage, pro…t pairs that can be generated given the set of disclosure I , it is convenient to think of the …rm as choosing such a pair (W T I ; T I ) from the feasible set ( I ).
Note that we assume …rms cannot disclose what they do not know and we do not allow …rms to manipulate the statistics that they disclose. We believe these not only to be useful assumptions for tractability, but plausible ones when we interpret the information disclosed to outside …rms as arising from choices about organizational design and the organization of production (for example, on the extent and composition of teamwork rather than solo production, the extent of hierarchy and the level of individual discretion). 18 Moreover, reputation concerns (and the desire to hire other workers in the future) might also allow …rms to make credible commitments about more direct disclosure policies (such as consulting …rms choosing whether or not to cite juniors involvement in …nal reports, or decisions to give them more or less access to clients). Note that while many of these examples concern discrete rather than continuous scalar disclosure statistics, similar economic forces should be present, and our assumptions on distributions as well as the disclosed statistic are analytically convenient.
Analysis
Our simplifying assumptions enable us to characterise equilibria piecemeal by solving two maximisation problems, one for a representative competitive …rm J and another for a skill-augmenting …rm K. Note, that for a given disclosure policy T I , the second period is identical to the model described in Section 2. In particular, the expected second period wage is given by (2) and expected second period pro…t by (3) . Workers in assessing …rst period contracts take into account both the wage o¤ered and, also, the expected second period wage. This, in turn, depends on the identity of the …rm (and the extent of general human capital that she anticipates acquiring in the training period) and the disclosure policy to which the …rm commits through the contract.
Competitive …rms attempt to hire one of the M N 1 'free' workers in the …rst period. Since they face …erce competition, they attract workers by transferring as much surplus as possible to the worker (up to the zero pro…t constraint). They transfer surplus most easily through a higher …rst period wage. Speci…cally, by o¤ering to pay their entire expected second period pro…t in training wages: w J = T J . Thus, the problem facing a competitive …rm J when choosing a disclosure policy is simply one of expected surplus
Following, Proposition 1, this is maximized by choosing G J -disclosure when this disclosure policy is available. This behaviour by competitive …rms pins down a worker's outside-option. Any worker turning down a training contract at a skill-augmenting …rm can receive W T J + T J at a competitive …rm. Denoting this equilibrium outside-option by U , the problem facing a skill-augmenting …rm K (or indeed any other) can be written as
where (x) denotes x when negative, zero otherwise. Notice that when U > W T K , the maximand in (17) di¤ers from that in (16) only by a constant, and when U W T K it coincides with (3); the …rm chooses the training wage and disclosure policy to maximize its second period pro…ts.
Overall, we de…ne an equilibrium as an array of training contracts for competitive …rms fw J ; T J g J each satisfying surplus maximisation (16) , and an array of training contracts for skill-augmenting …rms fw K ; T K g K each satisfying (worker participation constrained) pro…t maximisation (17) . The maximisation problems are entirely straightforward, given our characterization of the feasible set ( I ).
Equilibrium Contracts and Labour Market Outcomes: General Results
Here, we can use the characterization of second period wages and pro…ts from Section 3.2.2. In addition to using these to characterise contracts (which are typically hard to observe), we are also interested in their consequences for observable labour market outcomes. The following all depend heavily on the disclosure policy and are therefore characterised alongside equilibrium contracts for di¤erent …rms J; K:
1. Probability of labour turnover; 2. Unconditional wage distribution for workers; 3. Conditional wage distributions for retained and released workers.
The following result holds regardless of J (providing G J -disclosure is in this set). ii. Labour market outcomes: Labour turnover takes place with probability Pr[R J < G J ]:
The distribution of employment wages is identical to the distribution of G J : If G J and (R J G J ) are independent, the distribution of wages is the same for both retained and released workers; if G J and (R J G J ) are a¢ liated the distribution of wages for retained workers …rst degree stochastically dominates that for released workers.
Proof. A competitive …rm J chooses G J -disclosure since this maximises expected surplus. Bertrand competition (zero pro…ts) ensures that
The labour market outcomes follow immediately from the choice of disclosure policy.
Proposition 5 is intuitive, the more striking results will appear when we contrast with the situation of skill-augmenting …rms.
Behaviour by competitive …rms pins down
This observation, together with Proposition 2, enables us to solve the maximisation problem in (17), and hence characterise the equilibrium behaviour of, and resulting labour market outcomes for, skill-augmenting …rms with available disclosure policies K = fG K ; R K ; ? K g.
Proposition 6. For a skill-augmenting …rm K with K = fG K ; R K ; ? K g;
ii. Labour market outcomes: Labour turnover takes place with probability
The distribution of employment wages is identical to the distribution of G K and, if G K and (R K G K ) are independent, is the same for both retained and released workers.
i. Contracts: ? K -disclosure and a training wage of w K = maxf U W ? K ; 0g:
ii. Labour market outcomes: Labour turnover takes place with positive probability (less than
The distribution of employment wages is degenerate at W ? K < E[G K ] for both retained and released workers.
U , then G K disclosure maximises surplus and the training wage w K = U E[G K ] just meets the worker participation constraint. Therefore this policy maximises …rm K expected pro…t subject to the worker participation constraint. If E[G K ] > U , then G K disclosure with training wages w K = 0 remains e¢ cient but the worker receives some of the surplus in excess of the participation constraint. In a neighbourhood where E[G K ] U is positive but small, the surplus paid to the worker remains less than the e¢ ciency loss of switching to another disclosure policy.
If E[G K ] U is positive and large enough, the extra surplus paid to the worker under G K disclosure will exceed the e¢ ciency loss under null disclosure. To verify this consider the two cases (a) w ? K U ; (b) w ? K < U : For case (a) Proposition 2(ii) establishes that pro…t is higher under null disclosure, training wages are set at zero. In case (b) …rm
The result follows since, by Assumption 3, R J G J and R K G K have the same (symmetric) distributions. Figure 4 displays the situation. Suppose the worker's outside-option is at the level of point A (above W G K ). In this case, even the high expected employment wage under G K -disclosure, fails to (strictly) satisfy the worker's participation constraint. To hire the worker, a skill-augmenting …rm K must surrender expected pro…t by paying a positive training wage. It will adopt a policy of G K -disclosure, since this maximises the "pie" and, with the worker's share …xed, leaves the largest possible share for the …rm. Alternatively, suppose the worker's outside-option is at the level of point B (below but in the neighbourhood of W G K ). In this case, the expected employment wage under G K -disclosure more than meets the worker's outside-option. The ideal strategy for …rm K would be to o¤er a negative training wage that held the worker to her outside-option and increased expected pro…t by W G K U . However, given worker credit constraints, this is not possible. With the …rm unable to claw back rent via the training wage, switching to a disclosure policy that generates adverse selection starts to look attractive. Unfortunately for the …rm, switching to ? K disclosure destroys surplus. Once it has compensated the worker for the shortfall in utility ( U W ? K ) by paying a positive training wage, the remaining level of expected pro…t is less than that achievable under G K -disclosure; i.e. in Figure 2 , point B lies to the left of G K . In contrast, suppose the worker's outside option is at the level of point C (some distance below W G K ). Now the …rm will choose ? K -disclosure. In this case the rent to be recouped is large enough to justify the destruction of surplus; i.e. point C lies to the right of G K .
Proposition 6 takes a restricted set of polices for comparison. This, it shares with most of the disclosure literature. The implications for labour market outcomes are rather stark, especially in that the distribution of wages for workers in the K …rms becomes degenerate. We now allow for a wider class of disclosure policies, again, by specialising to a joint normal distribution.
Equilibrium Contracts under joint normality
We return to the framework of Section 3.3 and suppose that the …rm can choose any disclosure policy of the form (11) . 19 We start by stating that …rms never adopt disclosure policies which induce a negative conditional correlation between estimates of inside productivity and outside productivity. Intuitively, this makes sense since if such a negative correlation were present, then the event that a worker is not retained becomes 'good news'regarding the outside productivity of the worker. This is the opposite of a winners' curse and the positive rather than adverse selection e¤ect would serve to drive up the wage o¤ers of competing employers, making it more expensive to retain workers. This, in e¤ect, transfers surplus from the …rm to the worker; however, the …rm can transfer surplus directly through …rst period wages, rather than through a disclosure policy that destroys overall surplus by misallocating the worker.
Proposition 7.
Under joint normality, neither competitive nor skill-augmenting …rms ever choose a disclosure policy with G I R I :T I < 0:
Proof. The fact that each competitive …rm J chooses G J -disclosure follows from Proposition 1. Suppose the skill-augmenting …rm chooses G K R K :T K < 0. Then expected second period pro…t is
where the …rst inequality follows from AS T K (T K ) 0 and the second follows from application of Jensen's inequality. A disclosure policy with G K R K :T K < 0 therefore leads to lower expected second period pro…t than general disclosure.
Finally, we can use our characterization of the feasible set of wage, pro…t pairs from Result 4, to characterize the disclosure policies chosen by skill-augmenting …rms is described as follows, where
Result 8. In the independent joint normal model, for a skill-augmenting …rm K,
, then contracts are G K -disclosure and a training wage of w K = maxf U E[G K ]; 0g:
and a training wage of w K = 0.
This result follows directly from the calculation of the e¢ ciency frontier. It is helpful to compare the equilibrium contracts chosen by a skill-augmenting …rm when K is joint normal with the case discussed in Section 5.1 where
The …rst part of the result is simply a restatement of the …rst part of Proposition 6: if the general skills acquired at …rm K are expected to be low, then …rm K chooses G Kdisclosure to meet the worker's reservation utility in the most e¢ cient manner possible. However, if …rm K is advantaged, so that the general skills acquired at …rm K are expected to exceed the worker's reservation utility (as pinned down by the competitive fringe), then the …rm will switch to a policy that generates adverse selection. Of course, it is in the …rm's interest to depress wages as e¢ ciently as possible and so the disclosure policy will be a (noiseless) di¤erence of inside and outside productivity. As the size of the skill gap increases, …rm K claws back rent from the worker by increasing expected adverse selection (decreasing b further below zero thereby increasing G K R K :T K ).
Comparative Statics of Labour Market Outcomes
This section traces the map from technological di¤erences, via human capital management policies through information management to labour market outcomes at the level of the …rm.
With V ar(G K ) normalised to 1, the technological position of a skill-augmenting …rm K is characterised by three parameters: expected general human capital formation E[G K ]; expected match quality E[R K G K ] and the variance of match quality V ar(R K G K ). The following result describes how changes in these parameters impact on labour market outcomes in the skill-augmenting sector (holding the technological position of the competitive sector …xed).
Result 9. In the independent joint normal model,
i. the probability of labour turnover is independent of E[
ii. the distribution of employment wages is identical to the distribution of G K :
i. the probability of labour turnover is increasing in V ar(R K G K ) and decreasing in
ii. the distribution of employment wages has mean U but is no longer normal, with inequality decreasing in V ar(R K G K ) and increasing in E[
Note that the model and this result assume that each …rm has a single worker, but they are suggestive on the relationship between wage dispersion and performance at the …rm level. Speci…cally, skill-augmenting …rms are able to earn pro…ts through their rare ability to augment human-capital and so should be observed as more pro…table. This pro…tability arises since they are able to extract some rents from workers, …rst by driving down training wages leading to greater wage inequality between …rst-and secondperiod workers, but also through choosing innovative disclosure policies that compress second-period employment wages, suggesting reduced second-period wage dispersion. 20 Result 9 is illustrated in Figures 5 and 6 ( 
. We start by discussing the consequences of technological changes in the skill-augmenting sector for labour turnover.
Our analysis of the general model established that, for values of E[G K ] U , labour turnover occurs with probability Pr[R K < G K ] and is therefore independent of E[G K ] by Assumption 3. Figure 5 Panel a plots the case where match quality is distributed symmetrically around zero, giving rise to a turnover rate of 50% (the top line). Consider a technological change that increases E[G K ] above U : A skill-augmenting …rm will respond by adjusting its disclosure policy (decreasing b) to claw back the associated rent from its worker. The adverse selection associated with this change in organisational design depresses labour turnover.
As one might expect, labour turnover also decreases with a change in technology that 'improves matching
Here, however, endogenous organisational design dampens the e¤ect. Figure 5 Panel b illustrates by plotting the turnover rate against
, …rm K will seek to impose adverse selection. Suppose that E[R K G K ] declines below 1 but that …rm K (sub-optimally) leaves its disclosure policy …xed at b 0:37. Labour turnover increases but at a slower rate than Pr[(R K G K ) < 0] (compare the middle and the highest line in the Figure) . In other words, adverse selection mutes the e¤ect of a decline in E[R K G K ] on labour turnover. This dampening e¤ect becomes stronger if …rm K adjusts its disclosure policy to keep its worker at U (the bottom line in the Figure) . As E[R K G K ] declines, regression to the mean ameliorates adverse selection. Larger deviations (more negative b) from G K disclosure are therefore necessary to generate su¢ cient adverse selection and these adjustments depress labour turnover further below
may explain …rm performance and focuses on worker e¤ort, in particular, contrasting the incentives and wage dispersion that arise in tournaments (as in Lazear and Rosen, 1981) with the collaboration that arises from fairness and low wage dispersion (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990 and Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or the incentives for in ‡uence activities and rent-seeking that may be prevalent with high wage-dispersion (Milgrom, 1988 and Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) or sabotage in tournaments (Lazear, 1989) . Our results, suggest that …rm performance and the extent of wage-dispersion may both arise from the extent to which a …rm has an advantage over its rivals in augmenting general human capital (or providing a platform for a successful career). 
Suppose that V ar(R K G K ) declines below 1 but that …rm K (sub-optimally) leaves its disclosure policy …xed at b 0:64: Labour turnover decreases further below Pr[(R K G K ) < 0] (compare the bottom and highest line in the Figure) . This e¤ect is muted, however, if …rm K adjusts its disclosure policy to keep its worker at U (the middle line in the Figure) : Since poorer information about match quality reduces the regression to the mean e¤ect, adverse selection hits harder. Smaller deviations (less negative b) from G K disclosure are necessary to generate su¢ cient adverse selection and this depresses labour turnover less below
Turning to the distribution of employment wages at …rm K: for values of E[G K ] U , the distribution of employment wages is identical to the distribution of G K . Given our assumption that G K and (R K G K ) are independent, the distributions for retained and released workers are identical. For higher values of E[G K ]; …rm K adjusts its disclosure policy to keep the expected employment wage equal to U : Since adverse selection is greater at lower quantiles of T K (recall Figure 3) , the distribution of employment wages is no longer normal, but becomes negatively skewed. . Of course, it is optimal for the …rm to alter its disclosure policy, in this case to b 2. This adjustment drives the mean employment wage back down to U and, with adverse selection hitting hardest on the low T K quantiles, skews the distribution to the left.
The remaining panels in Figure 6 hold expected general human capital formation …xed and vary the distribution of match quality
declines, so that the expected retained human capital is lower, but …rm K (sub-optimally) leaves its disclosure policy …xed then there is less adverse selection. As Panel b illustrates, this change in adverse selection both compresses, and increases the mean of, the distribution of employment wages. Since the expected employment wage now exceeds the worker's reservation utility, it is optimal for the …rm to alter its disclosure policy, here to b 1:51. This adjustment reintroduces adverse selection and skews the distribution of employment wages to the left. 
and that …rm K chooses its optimal disclosure policy with b 0:64: If V ar(R K G K ) declines but …rm K (sub-optimally) leaves its disclosure policy …xed there is more adverse selection. As Panel c illustrates, this change in adverse selection disperses, and decreases the mean of, the distribution of employment wages. Since the expected wage is below U , it is optimal for the …rm to alter its disclosure policy, now to b 0:30. This adjustment removes adverse selection, reducing the left skewness of distribution of employment wages. Indeed, as Panel c makes clear, the overall e¤ect of a decrease in the variance of R K G K resembles a mean-preserving spread in wages.
Note that one can interpret an increase in the variance of an estimate as an improvement in information. This follows since conditioning on extra information produces a mean preserving spread of conditional expectations:
An increase in V ar(R K G K ) therefore follows from technological changes that give …rm K a better idea of worker match quality. Improvements in information about match quality therefore compress wage distributions. This contrasts with improvements in information about general human capital (when …rms are competitive).
Concluding Remarks
This paper has made two related contributions. First, we have introduced a model where workers may vary in both their general ability and their match with particular …rms. In this context, we considered the implications of di¤erent information structures on wages and pro…ts, highlighting that information structures have implications not only for the distribution of surplus between an employer and worker, but, also, for the aggregate surplus through the possibility of misallocation. Second, we characterised optimal information management policies. These policies are determined according to whether the employer is constrained principally by the need to attract workers (participation constraints) or by an inability to fully leverage acquired general human capital talent (credit constraints). As has been recognised since Akerlof (1970) , the distribution of information can have striking, apparently disproportionate, e¤ects on market outcomes. Our analysis has also highlighted that, where organisational responses to technological change impact through information ‡ows, the consequences for wages and turnover rates may appear to be disproportionately large.
There are several natural extensions that might be considered beyond generalizing the results to other wage determination protocols, other types of disclosure policy, or di¤erent distributional assumptions. In particular, we brie ‡y discuss broadening the strategic decisions available to employers to include additional decisions on training and information acquisition. First, it is natural to endogenize the extent to which a …rm augments human capital in the training period. If a …rm can commit to provide a level of training which would supplement a worker's natural ability then in the initial period of competition, …rms would compete by o¤ering wages, and committing to both a disclosure policy and training. As long as training is e¢ cient (that is, as long as the second period productivity it generates is greater than the …rst period cost) then the most cost-e¤ective means to attract workers is by providing more training. At some point, however, this might involve worker paying for these general skills up-front, as proposed by Becker (1964) . Of course, this is impractical when the sums involved are signi…cant, especially for credit constrained workers at the outset of their careers. Nevertheless, in the manner described in Section 5, the worker can e¤ectively pledge expected second period wages by agreeing to a contract with an information disclosure policy that leads to higher expected second period wages.
In contrast to our results above, even when all …rms are identical, they may choose to restrict the information that is released when allowing for a training decision. Again, competition among …rms suggest that …rms seek to create as much surplus as possible and transfer it to workers in order to attract them. However, in Section 5, the only lever that a …rm possesses to generate more surplus is to release information that allows for the worker to be e¢ ciently allocated in the second period. When the …rms have a training decision, training is potentially another lever with which to create surplus. If the e¢ cient level of training is such that it would drive the worker's training wage to the point where the worker's …rst period credit constraint binds, then there is a tradeo¤ between providing more e¢ cient training and transferring surplus to the …rm to compensate for this training which might require the worker agreeing to an (ine¢ cient) information disclosure policy that allows the …rm to earn some additional second period rents. 21 Equivalently, Becker (1964) has argued that workers must pay for general human capital and credit constraints might therefore lead to underprovision; here we argue that agreeing to an information disclosure policy might be a second-best means of allowing the worker to pay for training. This discussion complements a literature on information frictions and training (for example Katz and Ziderman (1990) , or Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) for an overview) which has typically, assumed that …rms cannot commit to training policies, instead treating information frictions as exogenous. In these papers, exogenous information frictions allow the current employer to capture some return for general training and so lead to training provision. Here instead, we posit the reverse causality: training (when the worker is credit constrained and cannot pay for it) leads to worker to agree to information policies that allow the …rm to earn a return on its training investment. 22 Finally, we have, of course, taken a somewhat narrow view of organisational design, even given our exclusive focus on information management. In particular, we have abstracted from endogenous information acquisition; for example, through …rms'decisions on the extent, nature and frequency of appraisal. 23 For the purposes of inducing adverse selection, acquiring more information with a …xed amount disclosed is akin to disclosing less with a …xed amount acquired. In other words, …rms can manage information simply by getting to know their workers better. Skill augmenting and competitive …rms will generally take a very di¤erent view. For competitive …rms, information privately acquired about their worker's general human capital becomes a hot potato-something to be passed on to the market as quickly as possible. In contrast, for skill-augmenting …rms, incentives to acquire private information about worker productivity are more nuanced and one would expect to see deliberate policies designed to generate such information. These di¤erential incentives are likely to accentuate the increased wage inequality for skill-augmenting …rms identi…ed in the paper.
or using Cochrane's identity GT = GT:R + GR:T RT , Noting that since 0 (x) = x (x),
gives the required expression for w T I (t).
